# A Birthday paradox for Markov Chains and an optimal bound for Pollard's Rho to solve discrete log

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#### ANTS 2008

#### Discrete Logarithm

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

#### Method of Proof

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

Further Reading

#### Outline

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# Further Reading

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# Crypto and Discrete Log

## El Gamal Encryption

Alice chooses cyclic group G = ⟨g⟩ with prime order p, and x ∈ {0, 1, ..., p − 1}.
 Public Key: G,g,p,h = g<sup>x</sup>. Private Key: x.

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

# Crypto and Discrete Log

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- Alice chooses cyclic group G = ⟨g⟩ with prime order p, and x ∈ {0,1,...,p-1}.
   Public Key: G,g,p,h = g<sup>x</sup>. Private Key: x.
- ▶ Bob converts message *m* into group element *m* ∈ *G*. Chooses random *y* ∈ {0, 1, ..., *p* − 1}. Sends *c*<sub>1</sub> = *g<sup>y</sup>*, *c*<sub>2</sub> = *m h<sup>y</sup>*.

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• Alice reads message 
$$m = c_2 c_1^{-x}$$
.

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

#### Sketch of Algorithm

Given cyclic group G = ⟨g⟩.
 For h ∈ G find x = log<sub>g</sub> h, i.e. solve g<sup>x</sup> = h.

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

#### Sketch of Algorithm

- Given cyclic group  $G = \langle g \rangle$ . For  $h \in G$  find  $x = \log_g h$ , i.e. solve  $g^x = h$ .
- ▶ Pollard: Choose  $(a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{Z}^2_{|G|}$  until some  $g^{a_i} h^{b_i} = g^{a_j} h^{b_j}$ .

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- Collision: Then  $x = (a_i a_j)(b_j b_i)^{-1} \mod |G|$ .

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- Collision: Then  $x = (a_i a_j)(b_j b_i)^{-1} \mod |G|$ .
- Birthday Paradox: Requires  $\sqrt{\frac{\pi}{2}|G|} \approx 1.25\sqrt{|G|}$  samples.

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

# Pollard's Rho Algorithm

### The Algorithm

► Floyd's: Fix random function  $f : \mathbb{Z}^2_{|G|} \to \mathbb{Z}^2_{|G|}$ . Let  $(a_{i+1}, b_{i+1}) = f(a_i, b_i)$ . Then  $(a_i, b_i) = (a_{2i}, b_{2i})$  in a few more steps.

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

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 Pollard: Partition G into T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>. Let f(a, b) = (a + 1, b), (a, b + 1), or (2a, 2b) if g<sup>a</sup>h<sup>b</sup> ∈ T<sub>1</sub> or T<sub>2</sub> or T<sub>3</sub> respectively.

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- Teske: Fix (random) partition, random start  $\rightarrow 1.6\sqrt{|G|}$ . (ranges from  $0.86\sqrt{|G|}$  to  $2.8\sqrt{|G|}$ ).

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- ► Teske: Fix (random) partition, random start  $\rightarrow 1.6\sqrt{|G|}$ . (ranges from  $0.86\sqrt{|G|}$  to  $2.8\sqrt{|G|}$ ).
- ► Markov chain: Random partition → random walk (until collision).

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

## Theoretical Results

### General DLOG

- ▶ Pohlig-Helman ('78): Suffices to assume N = |G| prime.
- Shoup ('97): Generic algorithm requires  $\Omega(\sqrt{N})$  steps.

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### Pollard Rho specific

► Miller-Venkatesan (ANTS '06): Random walk converges in O(log<sup>3</sup> N) and collision in O(√N(log<sup>3</sup> N)).

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

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- *MV (PC):* a.e. *N*, random start  $\rightarrow$  non-degenerate 1 o(1).

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

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### Pollard Rho specific

•  $KMT (FOCS '07): O(\log N \log \log N)$  and  $O(\sqrt{N \log N \log \log N}).$ 

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

## **Theoretical Results**

### General DLOG

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### Pollard Rho specific

• KMPT (ANTS '08): Collision in  $(1 + o(1))52.5\sqrt{N}$ .

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Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

# Theoretical Results

#### Remarks

 Past heuristic: After a while the walk looks random so Birthday Paradox applies; ignores dependencies between states.

Crypto and Discrete Log Pollard's Rho Algorithm Theoretical Results

## Theoretical Results

#### Remarks

▶ *KMPT (ANTS '08):* Assumes random partition; requires O(N) memory. Should suffice to use some pseudo-random partition (e.g. a hash function  $f : \mathbb{Z}_N \to \{1, 2, 3\}$ ).

Outline Discrete Logarithm Method of Proof Further Reading	Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools
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## Further Reading

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Birthday Paradox

#### Normal

*N* objects, choose with repetition  $\rightarrow$  something twice in  $O(\sqrt{N})$ .

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Birthday Paradox

#### Normal

*N* objects, choose with repetition  $\rightarrow$  something twice in  $O(\sqrt{N})$ .

#### Markov

Uniform walk on  $K_N$  has collision in  $O(\sqrt{N})$ .

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains: FOCS

Theorem Finite, ergodic, uniform,  $\frac{1/2}{N} \leq P^T(u, v)$  then collision in  $2\sqrt{2cTN}$ 

steps with prob  $1 - e^{-c}$ .

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains: New

Theorem: Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Finite, ergodic, uniform,  $\frac{1/2}{N} \leq P^{T}(u, v) \leq \frac{2}{N}$ , then collision in

$$2\sqrt{N}\max\{A_T, A_T^*\}+2T$$

steps with prob 1/32.

 $A_T = E(\#$ collisions two iid walks, T steps, same start)  $A_T^* =$  same for  $P^*$ 

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains: New

Theorem: Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Finite, ergodic, uniform,  $\frac{m}{N} \leq P^{T}(u, v) \leq \frac{M}{N}$ , then collision in

$$2\sqrt{\frac{2N}{M}\max\{A_{T}, A_{T}^{*}\}} + 2T$$

steps with prob  $m^2/2M^2$ .

 $A_T = E(\#$ collisions two iid walks, T steps, same start)  $A_T^* =$  same for  $P^*$ 

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Application to Rho Walk

Block Walk

• Stop after  $(a, b) \rightarrow (2a, 2b)$  step.

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Application to Rho Walk

#### Block Walk

Stop after 
$$(a, b) \rightarrow (2a, 2b)$$
 step.

► 
$$T = \log^2 N + o(1) \rightarrow$$
  
 $\frac{1 - o(1)}{N} \le P^T(u, v) \le \frac{1 + o(1)}{N}$ 

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Application to Rho Walk

### Pre-Mixing

•  $A_T, A_T^*$  small if walk diffuses quickly:

$$A_T, A_T^* \le 2 \sum_{j=0}^T (j+1) \max_{u,v} P^j(u,v)$$

# Application to Rho Walk

### Pre-Mixing

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Large "tree-like" spanning subgraph

$$P^{j}(u,v) \leq egin{cases} (2/3)^{j} & j \leq \lfloor \log_{2} N 
ight] \ rac{3/2}{N^{1-\log_{2}3}} \leq rac{3/2}{\sqrt{N}} & otherwise \end{cases}$$

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Application to Rho Walk

#### Collision Time

• Block:  $A_T, A_T^* \leq (1 + o(1)) 18$ .

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

# Application to Rho Walk

#### Collision Time

- Block:  $A_T, A_T^* \leq (1 + o(1)) 18$ .
- Block:  $(1 + o(1))24\sqrt{N}$ ; Rho:  $(1 + o(1))72\sqrt{N}$ .

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

## Application to Rho Walk

### Collision Time

- Block:  $A_T, A_T^* \leq (1 + o(1)) 18$ .
- Block:  $(1 + o(1))24\sqrt{N}$ ; Rho:  $(1 + o(1))72\sqrt{N}$ .
- Improved proof  $\rightarrow$  Rho in  $(1 + o(1))52.5\sqrt{N}$

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

### Proving the Key Tools

► Birthday Paradox: Let S = #collisions  $\ge 2T$  steps apart. Then  $P(S > 0) \ge \frac{E(S)^2}{E(S^2)}$ , i.e. second moment.

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Mixing Time:

canonical paths, strong stationary time, Fourier, character/quadratic form.

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## Proving the Key Tools

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Mixing Time:

canonical paths, strong stationary time, Fourier, character/quadratic form.

• Fast probability diffusion:

Early steps of a SST (a strong form of coupling), or Fourier analysis.

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

## **Open Question**

### When can we celebrate Birthday?

Suppose P is reversible: π(x)P(x, y) = π(y)P(y, x), for every pair of states x, y ∈ Ω.
 If π: uniform over Ω, with |Ω| = N, then do we have a collision in O(√N) whp?

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# **Open Question**

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- Suppose P is reversible: π(x)P(x, y) = π(y)P(y, x), for every pair of states x, y ∈ Ω.
   If π: uniform over Ω, with |Ω| = N, then do we have a collision in O(√N) whp?
- Not true in general: Nonreversibility requires an additional assumption, such as ours.

Birthday Paradox for Markov Chains Application to Rho Walk Proving the Key Tools

## Mixing Time

### **Canonical Paths**

 Mihail, Fill: Mixing time upper bounded in terms of λ<sup>-1</sup><sub>PP\*</sub>. Reversal π(x)P\*(x, y) = π(y)P(y, x). If lazy then λ<sub>PP\*</sub> ≥ λ<sub>P</sub>.

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- Sinclair, Diaconis & Strook: Spectral gap λ<sub>P</sub> lower bounded using paths along edges of P.

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- Sinclair, Diaconis & Strook: Spectral gap λ<sub>P</sub> lower bounded using paths along edges of P.
  - $\Rightarrow$  Mixing time bound using paths along edges of  $PP^*$ .

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- Sinclair, Diaconis & Strook: Spectral gap λ<sub>P</sub> lower bounded using paths along edges of P.
  - $\Rightarrow$  Mixing time bound using paths along edges of  $PP^*$ .
- ► Montenegro: Better path method when non-reversible, non-lazy and min<sub>P(x,y)>0</sub> P(x, y) is small (non-constant); based on Evolving Sets, a consequence of Diaconis-Fill.

### Mixing Time

Canonical Paths Finite, ergodic,  $\pi P = \pi$ ,  $\pi(x)P^*(x, y) = \pi(y)P(y, x)$ ,

 $\forall u \neq v \in \Omega$ : path  $\gamma_{uv}$  along  $PP^*$ 

## Mixing Time

**Canonical Paths** 

Let

$$A = \max_{x \neq y: PP^*(x,y) \neq 0} \frac{1}{\pi(x) PP^*(x,y)} \sum_{\gamma_{ab} \ni (x,y)} \pi(a) \pi(b) |\gamma_{ab}|.$$

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## Mixing Time

If 
$$\pi_* = \min_{v \in \Omega} \pi(v)$$
 then  
 $T \ge 2A \log \frac{1}{\epsilon \pi_*} \implies \pi(v)(1-\epsilon) \le P^T(u,v) \le \pi(v)(1+\epsilon)$ 

## Mixing Time

Canonical Paths Finite, ergodic,  $\pi P = \pi$ ,  $\pi(x)P^*(x, y) = \pi(y)P(y, x)$ ,

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#### Let

$$A = \max_{x \neq y: PP^*(x,y) \neq 0} \frac{1}{\pi(x) PP^*(x,y)} \sum_{\gamma_{ab} \ni (x,y)} \pi(a) \pi(b) |\gamma_{ab}|.$$

If  $\pi_* = \min_{\nu \in \Omega} \pi(\nu)$  then

$$T \geq 2 \, A \, \log rac{1}{\epsilon \pi_*} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \pi(v)(1-\epsilon) \leq {P}^{T}(u,v) \leq \pi(v)(1+\epsilon)$$

## Mixing Time

Paths

• Observe  $BB^*(u, \cdot)$  is concentrated near  $u, u \pm k, etc$ .

### Mixing Time

Paths

• Consider  $B_{1+\delta} = (1-\delta)B + \delta B^2$  for small  $\delta$ .

## Mixing Time

Paths

• Consider 
$$B_{1+\delta} = (1-\delta)B + \delta B^2$$
 for small  $\delta$ .  
•  $B_{1+\delta}B_{1+\delta}^*(u, 2u)$   
 $\geq B_{1+\delta}(u, 4u)B_{1+\delta}^*(4u, 2u)$   
 $\geq \frac{\delta}{9}\frac{1-\delta}{3} \geq \frac{\delta(1-\delta)}{81}$ 

## Mixing Time

Paths

► Consider 
$$B_{1+\delta} = (1-\delta)B + \delta B^2$$
 for small  $\delta$ .  
►  $B_{1+\delta}B_{1+\delta}^*(u, 2u)$   
 $\geq B_{1+\delta}(u, 4u)B_{1+\delta}^*(4u, 2u)$   
 $\geq \frac{\delta}{9}\frac{1-\delta}{3} \geq \frac{\delta(1-\delta)}{81}$   
►  $B_{1+\delta}B_{1+\delta}^*(u, 2u+1)$   
 $\geq B_{1+\delta}(u, 4u+2)B_{1+\delta}^*(4u+2, 2u+1)$   
 $\geq \frac{\delta}{27}\frac{1-\delta}{3} = \frac{\delta(1-\delta)}{81}$ 

## Mixing Time

### Paths

▶ Observe  $RR^*(u, \cdot)$  is at  $u, u + 1 - k, u + k - 1, 2u - 1, 2u - k, \frac{u}{2} + \frac{1}{2}, \frac{u}{2} + \frac{k}{2}.$ ▶ Consider  $R^2R^{*2}(u, \cdot).$ 

### Mixing Time

Paths

• Paths from  $u \rightarrow v$ : Set  $n = \lceil \log_2 N \rceil$ .

## Mixing Time

Paths

$$x = (v - 2^n u) \mod N = (x_0 x_1 \cdots x_{n-2} x_{n-1})_2.$$

### Mixing Time

 $\mathsf{Paths}$ 

Path 
$$u_0 = u$$
,  $u_{i+1} = 2u_i + x_i$ , so  $u_n \equiv 2^n u + x \equiv v$ .

### Mixing Time

### Paths

▶ Paths from 
$$u \rightarrow v$$
: Set  $n = \lceil \log_2 N \rceil$ .  
 $x = (v - 2^n u) \mod N = (x_0 x_1 \cdots x_{n-2} x_{n-1})_2$ .  
Path  $u_0 = u$ ,  $u_{i+1} = 2u_i + x_i$ , so  $u_n \equiv 2^n u + x \equiv v$ .

## Mixing Time

Paths

► Congestion: Edge (a, b) with  $b \equiv 2a + \{0, 1\} \mod N$ . (a, b) is *i*th edge of  $\gamma_{uv}$  for  $2^{i-1} \times 2^{n-i}$  choices of u, v.  $\Rightarrow$  at most  $n 2^{n-1} \le n N$  paths include edge (a, b).

## Mixing Time

Paths

• Conclusion: If 
$$T \ge \frac{486}{\delta(1-\delta)} \lceil \log_2 N \rceil^3$$
 then  
 $\forall u, v \in \mathbb{Z}_N : \frac{1}{N} (1 - 1/N^2) \le B_{1+\delta}^T (u, v) \le \frac{1}{N} (1 + 1/N^2)$ 

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### Further Reading

## Further Reading

 J.H. Kim, R. Montenegro, Y. Peres, P. Tetali.
 A Birthday Paradox for Markov chains, with an optimal bound for collision in the Pollard Rho Algorithm for Discrete Logarithm.
 http://www.ravimontenegro.com/research/prho.pdf